The Re-Emergence of Schelling in a Time of Emergency

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A comprehensive examination submitted to Professor Jacob Sherman

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Preface

The philosophy of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) cannot be adequately grasped in abstraction from the spirit that animated his individual personality. While he spent his philosophical career striving to realize the Absolute system, he did so in full recognition of the fact that the Absolute is not finally a logical system, but a living actuality.¹ Accordingly, for Schelling, “life is the criterion of truth.”² Though his critics often dismissed his thought as fragmentary and protean, C. S. Peirce, in a letter to William James, remarked that it was precisely Schelling’s “freedom from the trammels of system” and willingness to approach philosophical ideas experimentally rather than dogmatically that he admired most: “In that, he is like a scientific man.”³

In the essay to follow, undertaken in the context of “a burgeoning Schelling renaissance”⁴ in the English-speaking world, as well as a planetary ecological emergency and geo-political crisis, I return to Schelling’s written corpus to draw upon the deep well of his thought in the hope that it can aid human civilization’s attempt to re-imagine itself. I believe his philosophy provides many of the anthropological, theological, and cosmological resources necessary for bringing forth alternative forms of modernity no longer bent on the destruction of earth and the disintegration of human communities.

I explore Schelling’s corpus for traces of the spirit that lived in his thoughts, being careful not to mistake the letter for the life. “When this element of life is withdrawn,”

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² Mason Richey and Markus Zisselberger, “Introduction,” Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology, xvi.
wrote Schelling, “propositions die like fruit removed from the tree of life.” He continues:

...the person is the world writ small...One who could write completely the history of their own life would also have, in small epitome, concurrently grasped the history of the cosmos.

Philosophy, for Schelling, though generated by the natural processes of the universe itself, is “throughout a work of freedom” and so “for each only what he has himself made it.” In philosophizing, the individual discovers within his or her own unique originality the creative life of the whole universe. Schelling’s personal biography, then, is not extraneous but essential to understanding his philosophical project.

**Philosophical biography**

Schelling was born in 1775 near Stuttgart, a descendent of preachers and church officials on both sides of his family as far back as records can be found. His father, Joseph Friedrich Schelling (1732-1812) was a well-known scholar of theology and ancient languages, and there is no doubt that the young Schelling benefited from his father’s extensive library and tutelage. At age 8, Schelling was sent to live with his uncle Nathanael Köstlin (1711-1790), the dean of a school in Nürtingen where Schelling was to study the classics. It was here that Schelling first met Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843), later his roommate at seminary in Tübingen, as well as the Pietist mystics Friedrich

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7 *Schelling's sämtliche Werke*, I/2; Bruce Matthews, *Schelling's Organic Form of Philosophy*, p. 199.
Christoph Oetinger (1702-1782) and Philipp Matthäus Hahn (1739-1790), both regular visitors to his uncle’s home.\(^\text{10}\) Hahn in particular had a profound personal and spiritual influence upon Schelling’s philosophical outlook.

Only two years after enrolling at Nürtingen, Schelling was sent home because he had outgrown the knowledge of his instructors, “[spending] most of his time in the company of books and adults.”\(^\text{11}\) By age 11, his father began letting him sit in on his seminary courses at Bebenhausen. He thrived alongside 18-year-olds, learning four ancient languages and reading Plato and Aristotle in Greek and Leibniz in Latin before reaching 14-years-old.

In the spring of 1790, when Schelling was 15, his friend and spiritual mentor Hahn passed away. Schelling wrote a eulogy on the occasion of his death, later becoming his first publication when it was printed in a Stuttgart newspaper.\(^\text{12}\) According to Schelling, the eulogy for Hahn was “the first poem [he] ever wrote in [his] life.”\(^\text{13}\) The fourth stanza, foreshadowing Schelling’s own commitment to Naturphilosophie,\(^\text{14}\) reads:

Did he not dare to speak, with astute demeanor
Still mortal, the forces of nature?
Did his eyes not plunge through the cosmos and earth’s dale
Searching and finding the purest trace of the deity?\(^\text{15}\)

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\(^{10}\) Matthews, *Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy*, 233n4.

\(^{11}\) Matthews, *Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy*, 47.

\(^{12}\) Matthews, *Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy*, 238n55.

\(^{13}\) 4 April 1811 to G. H. Schubert; Matthews, *Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy*, 62.

\(^{14}\) Matthews, *Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy*, 58.

\(^{15}\) Matthews, *Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy*, 223.
Later in the year, Schelling was granted special permission to enroll in seminary at the Tübinger Stift. There he reunited with Hölderlin and met Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) for the first time, both 5 years older than himself. As wind of the philosophical revolution instigated by Immanuel Kant in Königsberg and the political revolution occurring across the Rhine in France drifted into the Stift, the three friends became increasingly intoxicated by new ideas, ideas their seminary professors struggled to domesticate by rendering them compatible with traditional theology. Hahn’s lasting theosophical influence kept Schelling from ever completely accepting the premises of the Enlightenment, but there is no doubt that the newly quickened powers of reason, science, and freedom were extremely attractive to him.

Instead of succumbing to the mechanistic trends of the natural science of his age, Schelling was from the beginning committed to Hahn’s alchemical Naturphilosophie, wherein nature was understood to be the revealed body of a living God. Schelling realized that traditional literalist belief had no place in the modern world, but rather than rejecting religion entirely, he betrays his Pietist upbringing in seeking to replace belief with direct experiential knowledge of the divine life. Hahn called the experience of this knowledge the Zentralschua; Schelling, upon assimilating the philosophy of Fichte, would come to call it the intellectual intuition.

The impact of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) on the teenage Schelling was powerful, as indeed was the impact of Schelling on Fichte, 13-years his senior. Schelling’s first philosophical publication in the fall of 1794, aged 19, was Über die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie überhaupt (On the possibility of a form of

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16 Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 118.

17 Matthews, Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy, 36-37, 66.
philosophy in general). The essay engages directly with Fichte’s defense of the Kantian system in *Begriff de Wissenschaftslehre (Concept of the science of knowledge)*, published only months earlier.\(^\text{18}\) Schelling sent the *Form* essay along with an admiring letter to Fichte, to which the latter replied encouragingly. Fichte also sent a new and improved version of his science of knowledge entitled *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge, 1795)* to Schelling. Almost immediately, on Easter of 1795, Schelling published his *Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen (On the ego as the principle of philosophy or on the unconditioned in human knowledge)*.

The traditional reading would have it that Schelling was Fichte’s disciple during the early years of their collaboration (~1794-1799).\(^\text{19}\) More recent scholarship suggests not only that most of Schelling’s major philosophical commitments had already been formed prior to his encounter with Fichte’s subjective idealism,\(^\text{20}\) but that Schelling’s early essays substantially improved Fichte’s understanding of his own project.\(^\text{21}\) Hölderlin, who had graduated from the Stift two years earlier, visited Schelling shortly after the publication of *On the ego* in 1795. Having just attended Fichte’s lectures at the University of Jena, he reportedly told Schelling: “Take it easy. You’ve gotten as far as Fichte. I’ve heard him.”\(^\text{22}\)

For the next several years, Schelling published essays on critical philosophy in the *Philosophisches Journal* co-edited by Fichte, despite his growing dissatisfaction with

\(^{18}\) Richards, *The Romantic Conception of Life*, 120-121.


\(^{20}\) Matthews, *Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy*, 138-139.


the latter’s subjectivist approach. In 1796, the famed handwritten document, later titled “Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus” (“Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism”), emerged out of conversations between Schelling, Hölderlin, and Hegel. The document begins by affirming the Fichtean position on the absolute freedom of the ego, but balances this one-sided idealism by calling for a new kind of physics compatible with our nature as moral creatures and a “sensuous religion” capable of delivering this physics to the people. Hegel would eventually come to abandon the more radical positions of the “Systematic Program” to become the official philosopher of the Prussian state, while Hölderlin began showing signs of insanity by 1800. Schelling, it seems, was the only one of his friends to remain consistently committed to the document’s major outlines.

Stemming from discontent both with Hegel’s mechanically formulaic epistemological fundament and the poet’s [Hölderlin’s] surrender to madness, the vitality in Schelling’s thinking is the search to hold these opposites together in their many permutations.

Also in 1796, Schelling published Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus (Philosophical Letters on Criticism and Dogmatism), wherein he argues explicitly that transcendental idealism and Spinozist realism should be understood to be coordinate systems: the former tackles the absolute from a subjectivist perspective, leading to the annihilation of the object, while the latter attains the absolute objectively through the dissolution of the subject. Beginning in 1797 with his Ideen zu einer

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23 Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 123.
24 Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 124.
26 Frederick Beiser, German Idealism, 476-477.
Philosophie der Natur (Ideas for a philosophy of nature), Schelling published a series of groundbreaking and influential tracts on Naturphilosophie. These essays were the children of a marriage between Schelling’s theosophical convictions regarding nature as the self-externalization of God (Geistleiblichkeit\textsuperscript{27}) and his intense study of recent advances in the natural scientific study of astrophysics, electricity, magnetism, chemistry, physiology, and medicine.\textsuperscript{28} “What we want,” writes Schelling in Ideas,

is not that nature should coincide with the laws of our mind by chance...but that she herself, necessarily and originally, should not only express, but even realize the laws of our mind.\textsuperscript{29}

In 1798, after Goethe had met the 23-year-old Schelling and read an advanced copy of his latest treatise Von der Weltseele, eine Hypothese der höheren Physik zur Erklärung des allgemeinen Organismus (On the world soul, a hypothesis of the higher physics for the clarification of universal organicity),\textsuperscript{30} he interceded on Schelling’s behalf to have him appointed extraordinary professor of philosophy at the University of Jena.\textsuperscript{31}

Fichte was not impressed. He sought to distinguish his own position from what he perceived to be Schelling’s new turn toward realism, publishing thinly veiled criticisms of Schelling in subsequent issues of Philosophisches Journal.\textsuperscript{32} Shortly after the last of Schelling’s tracts on Naturphilosophie, the Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie (Introduction to the sketch of a system of nature philosophy),

\textsuperscript{27} Glenn Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition, 81.

\textsuperscript{28} Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 125.

\textsuperscript{29} Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature. Trans. Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath, 41.

\textsuperscript{30} Selections of which have recently been translated into English by Iain Hamilton Grant in Collapse: Philosophical Research and Development, Vol. VI (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2010), 58-95.

\textsuperscript{31} Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 148.

\textsuperscript{32} Beiser, German Idealism, 479.
had appeared in 1799, the rift between Fichte and Schelling had risen fully to the surface. The two began quarreling about a philosophical journal they’d been planning to co-edit.  

 Soon after, Fichte was forced to leave Jena due to the charge of atheism. Over the next few years, Fichte became increasingly dismissive of Schelling’s philosophical project, condescendingly writing to Schelling in 1801 that if only he would consider his own science of knowledge more deeply “[he] would in time enough correct [his] mistakes.” By the fall of 1801, Schelling had decided to start the *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie* (The Critical Journal of Philosophy) with Hegel instead of Fichte as co-editor, cementing their personal and professional split. The two never met or spoke again after 1802. Fichte died in Berlin on January 27th, 1814, Schelling’s 39th birthday.

 Schelling’s circle of friends in Jena at the turn of the century included Goethe, Schiller, the Schlegel brothers, and Novalis. During this time he became very close to Wilhelm’s wife, Caroline Schlegel (1763-1809). When she fell ill in May of 1800, she traveled with Schelling and her 15-year-old daughter Auguste to Bamberg to consult with doctors and soak in the nearby natural spas. By July, Caroline had recovered, but her daughter Auguste had fallen ill with dysentery. On July 12th, she died.

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34 Richards, *The Romantic Conception of Life*, 166.
38 Richards, *The Romantic Conception of Life*, 166.
Auguste’s sudden death was devastating for the entire circle. Schelling fell into a depression, while Caroline became more attached to him than ever. By early 1801, she had expressed her affection for him in a letter: “I love you, I revere you, no hour passes that I do not think of you.” Soon after, she revealed to her husband of five years that Schelling was “the first and only love of my life.” Wilhelm Schlegel handled the end of his marriage with grace and forbearance, even risking his own reputation to deflect and refute criticisms made against Schelling in a popular literary magazine claiming that his meddling in Auguste’s medical treatment had been the reason for her premature death. With the help of Goethe, Wilhelm and Caroline obtained a divorce in May of 1803. Caroline married Schelling in June.

It was back in 1801, during his period of collaboration with Schelling (~1800-1807), that Hegel published his first book, entitled Differenz des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie (The difference between the Fichtean and Schellingian systems of philosophy). The work shows how highly Hegel thought of Schelling’s so-called “identity philosophy” at the time. He argues in the preface that Schelling’s Naturphilosophie can “recompense nature for the mishandling that it suffered in Kant and Fichte’s systems” by

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40 Caroline Böhmer Schlegel to Schelling, February 1801, Caroline: Brief aus der Frühromantik, 2:42; Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 168.
41 Caroline Böhmer Schlegel to Wilhelm Schlegel, 6 March 1801, Caroline: Brief aus der Frühromantik, 2:65; Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 168.
42 Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 174-175.
43 Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 176n159.
44 Christopher Lauer, The Suspension of Reason in Hegel and Schelling, 71-82.
...[setting] Reason itself in harmony with nature, not by having Reason renounce itself or become an insipid imitator of nature, but by Reason recasting itself into nature out of its own inner strength.\textsuperscript{45}

Only six years later, Hegel would publish his most famous book, \textit{Phänomenologie des Geistes} (\textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, 1807), wherein he appears to dismiss the creative act of intellectual intuition he defended in the \textit{Differenz} essay, claiming it produces only an abstract absolute akin to “the night in which all cows are black.” The nature of the disagreement and eventual falling out between Schelling and Hegel is taken up in a subsequent section.\textsuperscript{46}

Schelling worked with Hegel on the \textit{Kritisches Journal} in Jena for two years before leaving for Wüzburg in 1803.\textsuperscript{47} After a 3-year stint at the Catholic university there, where Schelling was initially popular but ended up making few friends among the members of the school’s conservative administration,\textsuperscript{48} he was appointed to the Academy of Sciences in Munich in 1806. In 1808, he was named the Secretary General of the Academy of Fine Arts, a position Schelling held until 1821.

In 1809, while Schelling was working on \textit{Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände} (\textit{Philosophical investigations into the essence of human freedom}), Caroline contracted dysentery. In September, Caroline died “with an expression of cheerfulness and the most wonderfully peaceful look on her face,” according to Schelling.\textsuperscript{49}


\textsuperscript{46} See section heading “The difference between Hegel’s and Schelling’s system of philosophy” below.

\textsuperscript{47} The two even roomed together for a time when Hegel first moved to Jena in 1801 (Magee, \textit{Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition}, 79).

\textsuperscript{48} Richards, \textit{The Romantic Conception of Life}, 197.

\textsuperscript{49} Friedrich Schelling to Luise Gotter, 24 September 1809, \textit{Caroline: Briefe aus der Frühromantik}, 2:570; Richards, \textit{The Romantic Conception of Life}, 198.
remarried 3-years later, but the shock of Caroline’s death darkened his philosophical outlook, making him fully conscious of the contingency and “deep indestructible melancholy of all life,” as he wrote in the Freedom essay.\footnote{Schelling, \textit{Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom}, trans. Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt, 63.} Less than a month after Caroline died, Schelling wrote in a letter:

I now need friends who are not strangers to the real seriousness of pain and who feel that the single right and happy state of the soul is the divine mourning in which all earthly pain is immersed.\footnote{Brief über den Tod Carolines vom 2. Oktober, 1809, ed. Johann Ludwig Döderlein; Wirth, “Introduction,” \textit{Ages of the World}, x.}

He would publish only once more in his lifetime, but Schelling nonetheless worked tirelessly on a number of significant projects. In the months following Caroline’s death, he composed several drafts of a dialogue entitled \textit{Clara oder Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt: ein Gespräch} (Clara, or on nature’s connection to the spirit world: a dialogue).\footnote{Wirth, \textit{The Conspiracy of Life}, 29.} In this work, a physician, whose “bottom up”\footnote{Schelling, \textit{Clara}, trans. Fiona Steinkamp, 15.} approach to the science of healing is derived from Schelling’s own Naturphilosophie, attempts to coax Clara, who mourns the death of a dear friend, back down to earthly life from the ethereal bliss her soul longs to unite with. A priest offers a different but complementary approach, describing the interdependent “living rotation” of body, soul, and spirit that prevents the dead from soaring entirely beyond earth:

For only a few pass over so pure and free of any love for earthly life that they can be absolved immediately...[to disappear] in God like a drop in the ocean.”\footnote{Schelling, \textit{Clara}, trans. Fiona Steinkamp, 35, 52, 59.}
Caroline’s ghost haunts the pages of this dialogue, as Schelling struggles to account for the ultimate destiny of her once-occurrent personality within the infinite current of the one cosmic life. Unlike the philosophical propositions of philosophers past which, as described by Hegel in his *Phenomenology*, dialectically survive death to be sublated in the course of the Idea’s self-unfolding, Caroline’s spirit cannot be abstractly reduced to “a few short, uncompleted propositions on a piece of paper.”55 Her death was for Schelling “a singular and absolute loss.”56

In December of 1810, with the damp air still abuzz after a violent thunderstorm, Schelling wrote in his journal that work on *Die Weltalter* (*The Ages of the World*) was “begun in earnest.”57 *The Ages of the World* has been described as his magnum opus, a “self-composing cosmic poem”58 that dives straight into the darkness of the cosmotheandric mystery that would consume Schelling’s thought for the rest of his life. Despite several announcements of its imminent publication in the course of the next two decades, the unfinished drafts were ultimately withheld until Schelling’s *Sämtliche Werke* was published by his son Karl in 1856, two years after his death. His late philosophies of mythology and of revelation should be considered the fruits of insights developed in the course of the *Weltalter* project, which itself remains in many respects continuous with his early *Naturphilosophie*. In his lectures on the philosophy of mythology, delivered in Berlin beginning in 1841, Schelling says of myth that it

56 Wirth, *The Conspiracy of Life*, 216.
“indisputably has the closest link with nature,” and that modern explanations suffered due to “a lack of natural philosophical ideas.” He goes on to argue that we must learn to see mythology as a nature elevated into the spiritual realm through an enhancing refraction. Only the means [have been] missing to make the enhancement conceivable.59

In other words, in these lectures, Schelling attempts to articulate the way myths “arise from the human soul’s prereflective immersion in the divine substance of the cosmos.”60 Rather than reducing myths to allegorical inventions of the human mind, Schelling argues that, in fact, it is the human mind that has been invented by myth.

Though these lectures were initially “a kind of celebrity event”61 attended by the likes of Kierkegaard, Engels, and Bakunin, their message, though influential in some respects,62 fell largely upon deaf ears. Those in attendance had been lead to expect Schelling would sharply rebuke the now deceased Hegel (quelling the radical Hegelians had been the intention of the state and university officials who called him to Berlin63), but to their disappointment, Schelling sought healing, rather than polemic.64 The lukewarm reception of the lectures is a reflection of a change in the Zeitgeist. The philosophical quickening which had inspired so many German minds around the turn of the century

59 Schelling, Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology, trans, Wirth, 155-156.
60 Jerry Day, Voegelin, Schelling, and the Philosophy of Historical Existence, 72.
62 Kierkegaard’s debt to Schelling’s characterization of Hegel’s philosophy is well known. Emerson translated and published the first of Schelling’s Berlin lectures in an issue of The Dial in January of 1843, writing in a letter to a friend at time: “To hear Schelling might well tempt the firmest rooted philosopher from his home, and I confess to more curiosity in respect to his opinions than to those of any living psychologyst” (Norbert Guterman, “Introduction,” On University Studies, xix).
63 Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 198.
64 Schelling, Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology, trans. Wirth, viii.
had by the 1840s all but dried up as Europe’s intelligentsia began to sink into the scientistic positivism that would dominate for the remainder of the century and beyond.

Schelling retired into obscurity in 1846. In the summer of 1854, poor in health, he traveled to Bad Ragaz, Switzerland to take the cure. His spirit left its 79-year-old body on August 20—a spirit, it seems, who was born too early.\textsuperscript{65} “Perhaps the one is still coming,” writes Schelling in the introduction to \textit{Ages of the World},

who will sing the greatest heroic poem, grasping in spirit something for which the seers of old were famous: what was, what is, what will be. But that time has not yet come. We must not misjudge our time.\textsuperscript{66}

\section*{Literature review}

This section assesses the reasons for the contemporary resurgence of scholarly interest in Schelling. At least since the 1990s, after more than a century and a half on the shelf, Schelling’s corpus has been re-emerging “with increasing intensity” in the English speaking world.\textsuperscript{67} There are many reasons to reconsider Schelling’s philosophical \textit{oeuvre}, but the current resurgence in interest seems to orbit primarily around his unique approach to the problem of nature, whether the nature of the cosmos, of the human, or of the divine.

In his prized 1809 essay \textit{Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom}, Schelling writes:

\textsuperscript{65} Wirth, “Introduction,” \textit{Schelling Now}, 5.

\textsuperscript{66} Schelling, \textit{Ages of the World}, trans. Wirth, xl.

\textsuperscript{67} Wirth, “Schelling’s Contemporary Resurgence,” 585.
The entire new European philosophy since its beginning (with Descartes) has the common defect that nature is not available for it and that it lacks a living ground.\(^6\)

The non-existence of nature for thought in the modern period has had terrible consequences for human history and the natural world alike. From Descartes through to Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, reason and science became increasingly self-castrating and solipsistic; “like the priests of the Phrygian goddess,” modern thought detached itself from the living forces of its natural ground.\(^6\)

In his *Philosophies of Nature After Schelling* (2005), Iain Hamilton Grant articulates the scientific and metaphysical consequences of ignoring nature, arguing that deep geological time defeats *a priori* the prospect of [nature’s] appearance for any finite phenomenologizing consciousness.\(^7\)

In other words, while the Kantian turn in the philosophy of science drained nature of ontological significance by defining it phenomenologically as “the sum total of appearing bodies,” the empirico-mathematical study of nature nonetheless came to reveal world-ages prior to the emergence of any consciousness for whom material nature could have made an appearance. Further, contemporary physics has de-corporealized (and so de-phenomenalized) matter in favor of a dynamic, field-theoretic understanding of natural forces. Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie* not only foresaw and helped to initiate these discoveries,\(^7\) it provides the new sciences of self-organizing systems with a more

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\(^7\) Consider, for example, Schelling’s influence on Hans Christian Ørsted’s discovery of electromagnetism in 1820.
coherent and adequate metaphysical foundation than the old mechanistic atomism.\textsuperscript{72} Naturphilosophie’s principle aim is to articulate, in a systematic but non-reductive way, how it is possible that natural productivity (\textit{natura naturans}), and not representational consciousness (\textit{cogito cogitans}), is \textit{a priori}. Grant suggests that Schelling was able to overturn the Kantian Revolution, not by outright dismissing the primacy of practical reason, but by literally grounding it in a “geology of morals” that transforms ethics into physics.\textsuperscript{73} The relevance of Schelling’s \textit{Naturphilosophie} to the metaphysical foundations of contemporary natural science will be taken up again in a subsequent section.\textsuperscript{74}

Some contemporary scholars, like Andrew Bowie in his \textit{Schelling and Modern European Philosophy} (1993), dismiss Schelling’s later mythopoetic and theogonic speculations into the divinity of nature and the nature of divinity as “evidently dead,”\textsuperscript{75} while others, like Grant, simply ignore it. In \textit{The Dark Ground of Spirit: Schelling and the Unconscious} (2012), S. J. McGrath pays very close attention to Schelling’s Böhmian musings, but interprets them largely in a depth psychological, rather than cosmological or philosophical context. While I agree with McGrath that Schelling deserves credit for initiating a mode of inquiry into the unconscious that would later be developed by Freud and Jung, the ontological agnosticism of the depth psychological approach makes it inappropriate for an appreciation of Schelling’s philosophical project. Bruce Matthews, in his \textit{Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy} (2011), documents the influence of the

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\textsuperscript{72} Marie-Luise Heuser-Kessler, \textit{Die Produktivität der Natur: Schellings Naturphilosophie und das neue Paradigma der Selbsorganziation in den Naturwissenshaften.}

\textsuperscript{73} Grant, \textit{Philosophies of Nature After Schelling}, 6, 199.

\textsuperscript{74} See section heading “Metaphysically (un)grounding the natural sciences” below.

\textsuperscript{75} Andrew Bowie, \textit{Schelling and Modern European Philosophy}, 5.
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theosophists Philipp Matthäus Hahn and Friedrich Christoph Oetinger on Schelling, but his analysis leaves Schelling’s writing after 1804 unconsidered. Of the scholars who do engage with the later religious dimension of Schelling’s thought on its own terms, Joseph Lawrence does so with the most forceful and direct voice by highlighting the socioeconomic and ecological consequences of the secular erasure of God from human and cosmic nature. All that remains to guide humanity’s hopes and dreams once the public sphere has been inoculated against authentic religiosity is the myth of the market, which according to Lawrence,

[eliminates] from view any acceptable alternative to the world of money and power, to which science itself has been subordinated.\footnote{76}{Lawrence, “Philosophical Religion and the Quest for Authenticity,” \textit{Schelling Now}, 14.}

Lawrence admits that if the worldview of scientific materialism is deemed “the last rational, and so discussable option,” then Schelling’s mythopoeic, cosmotheological project “can indeed be declared dead.”\footnote{77}{Lawrence, “Philosophical Religion and the Quest for Authenticity,” \textit{Schelling Now}, 15.} Contra positivism, just because natural science has epistemic limits doesn’t mean the questions it leaves unanswered are not worth asking:

...the inability to answer a question within the framework of demonstrative science does not mean that the question cannot be answered but rather than it must always be answered anew.\footnote{78}{Lawrence, “Philosophical Religion and the Quest for Authenticity,” \textit{Schelling Now}, 17.}

Lawrence defends Schelling’s prophetic call for a philosophical religion not because it offers some conclusive explanation for the nature and existence of reality, but because it
allows us once again to ask ultimate questions, seeking not certainty about or mastery over nature, but redemptive participation in her creative powers of becoming.\textsuperscript{79}

Instead of relenting to the deification of the market, which “leaves us with nothing to live for beyond personal desire,”\textsuperscript{80} Lawrence strives to realize Schelling’s demand that we transform ourselves “beyond the confines of self-interest [to] the possibility of a future in which what is right takes the place of what is right ‘for me.’”\textsuperscript{81} Without such transformation, the market will continue to reign with dire consequences for humanity and the planet. “The Earth does not have the carrying capacity for a universalized suburbia.”\textsuperscript{82} Lawrence’s concern for the social and ecological consequences of the secularization of nature is not uncommon among Schelling scholars.

Matthews (2012) begins his study of Schelling by dwelling on the ecological consequences of nature’s non-existence for human thought, arguing that Schelling’s analysis of how subjectivism sets the theoretical stage for the actual destruction of our natural environment is the most important reason for returning to his work.\textsuperscript{83} Indeed, many of Schelling’s recent commentators agree that the ecological emergency is directly related to the failure of modernity’s Kantian, positivistic understanding of nature and the “economic-teleological” exploitation of earth that it supports.\textsuperscript{84} Bowie, despite his discomfort with

\textsuperscript{79} Lawrence, “Philosophical Religion and the Quest for Authenticity,” \textit{Schelling Now}, 15-16.

\textsuperscript{80} Lawrence, “Philosophical Religion and the Quest for Authenticity,” \textit{Schelling Now}, 18.

\textsuperscript{81} Lawrence, “Philosophical Religion and the Quest for Authenticity,” \textit{Schelling Now}, 21.

\textsuperscript{82} Lawrence, “Philosophical Religion and the Quest for Authenticity,” \textit{Schelling Now}, 16.

\textsuperscript{83} Matthews, \textit{Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy}, 3.

\textsuperscript{84} Matthews, \textit{Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy}, 3.
theology, is in agreement with Matthews and Lawrence that Schelling’s thought has become increasingly relevant precisely because it speaks to the contemporary suspicion...that Western rationality has proven to be a narcissistic illusion...the root of nihilism [and] the ecological crisis.85

In *The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters* (1996), Slavoj Žižek looks to Schelling’s insights into the nature of human freedom in order to grasp how the possibility of an ecological crisis is opened up by man’s split nature—by the fact that man is simultaneously a living organism (and, as such, part of nature) and a spiritual entity (and, as such, elevated above nature).86

If humanity were completely spiritual, we would be utterly free of material needs and so have no reason to exploit nature, while if we were simply animal, we would symbiotically co-exist within the circle of life like any other predator. But because of our split nature, and our spiritual propensity for evil, “normal animal egotism” has become “self-illuminated,...raised to the power of Spirit,” leading to an absolute domination of nature “which no longer serves the end of survival but turns into an end-in-itself.”87 This is the “economic-teleological” principle: exploitation of earth purely for monetary profit. The detachment of humanity’s spiritual nature from the living reality of its earthly ground has lead to the decimation of that ground. Many contemporary eco-philosophers blame anthropocentrism—the perceived superiority of humanity over any other species—for the ecological crisis, but Schelling’s position is subtler:

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86 Slavoj Žižek, *The Indivisible Remainder*, 63.

87 Žižek, *The Indivisible Remainder*, 63.
For Schelling, it is the very fact that man is ‘the being of the Center’ which confers upon him the proper responsibility and humility—it is the ordinary materialist attitude of reducing man to an insignificant species on a small planet in a distant galaxy which effectively involves the subjective attitude of domination over nature and its ruthless exploitation.88

The essence of human spirituality, according to Schelling, is freedom, the decision between good and evil. Humanity’s fall into hubris is caused by the elevation of our animal nature over all other living creatures. The fall is not a fall into animality, but an inversion of the spiritual principle of freedom leading to the elevation of the periphery (our creatureliness) above the Center (our divine likeness). Further discussion of Schelling’s understanding of human freedom will be taken up in a subsequent section.89

Given that Schelling’s insights into the essence of human freedom are genuine, it would appear that more anthrodecentric nihilism can only exacerbate the ecological crisis. We must take responsibility for our knowledge and power. Healing human-earth relations will require that humanity actualize its spiritual potential as the burgeoning wisdom and compassion of cosmogenesis: “Created out of the source of things and the same as it,” writes Schelling in The Ages of the World, “the human soul is conscientious (Mitwissenschaft) of creation.”90

Also among those commentators coming to Schelling in the context of ecological emergency is Arran Gare, who similarly argues that Schelling’s Naturphilosophie provides a way to

88 Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder, 88n70.
89 See section heading “The nature of human freedom” below.
overcome the nihilism of European civilization...a nihilism that is reaching its apogee in the deification of the global market, postmodern fragmentation, and the specter of global ecocide.\footnote{Arran Gare. “From Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics: On the Way to Ecological Civilization,” \textit{Cosmos and History: The Journal and Natural and Social Philosophy}, Vol. 7: 2011, 26, 68; \url{http://cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/263} (accessed 8/7/2012).}

Gare goes on to argue that Schelling should be interpreted, not as an idealist, but as a \textit{Naturphilosoph} responsible for producing “the first coherent system of process metaphysics.”\footnote{Gare, “From Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics,” 28.} Gare cites the third draft of Schelling’s \textit{die Weltalter} (1815), where Schelling explicitly condemns idealism not only on philosophical, but on religious and scientific grounds, since it had reduced in turn both God and the natural world to an image, nay, an image of an image, a nothing of nothing, a shadow of a shadow...[arriving] at the dissolution of everything in itself into thoughts.\footnote{Schelling, \textit{The Ages of the World}, trans. Wirth, 106.}

Grant similarly challenges the mistaken assumption, popular since Hegel’s quip regarding “the night in which all cows are black,” that Schelling’s philosophy culminates in undifferentiated identity, arguing instead that he remained primarily a \textit{Naturphilosoph} attentive to the contingent materiality of the actual world through every phase of his philosophical career.\footnote{Grant, \textit{Philosophies of Nature After Schelling}, 3-4.} Frederick Beiser’s also claims in his \textit{German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism} (2002) that Schelling, even in his writings during the so-called \textit{Identitätssystem} phase, never wavered in his allegiance to \textit{Naturephilosophie}:

Schelling says that the philosopher can proceed in either of two directions: from nature to us, or form us to nature; but he makes his own preferences all too clear:
the true direction for he who prizes knowledge above everything is the path of
nature itself, which is that followed by the *Naturphilosoph*.\(^9^5\)

In his retrospective lectures *On the History of Modern Philosophy* in 1834, Schelling himself expressed his dismay that the phrase “identity system,” used only once in the preface of his 1801 text *Presentation of My System of Philosophy*, was interpreted as signaling a break with *Naturphilosophie*:

this designation was...used by those who never penetrated to the interior of the system to infer, or to make the uneducated part of the public believe, that in this system all differences, namely every difference of matter and spirit, of good and evil, even of truth and falsity, were annulled, that according to this system it was, in the everyday sense, all the same.\(^9^6\)

It is not unlikely that Schelling is here referring at least in part to Hegel’s infamous joke in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), mentioned above, about the “night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black.”\(^9^7\) In a letter to Schelling dated May 1, 1807, Hegel claimed to have been aiming his jibe at the shallowest of Schelling’s followers, rather than Schelling himself. Even earlier, in his history of philosophy lectures at the University of Jena in 1805, Hegel is careful to distinguish Schelling from his poor imitators.\(^9^8\) Schelling asked that Hegel clarify his real position in a second edition, but the next printing contained no such addition. It was the last letter ever exchanged between the two former friends.\(^9^9\)

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\(^9^5\) Beiser, *German Idealism*, 489.


\(^9^9\) Wirth, “Schelling’s Contemporary Resurgence,” 587.
Schelling’s emergence from the shadow of Hegel is due in no small part to the re-
evaluation of this exchange by contemporary scholars. In his *Schelling and the End of
Idealism* (1996), Dale Snow notes that Schelling had already addressed Hegel’s
criticisms of the *Identitätssystem* in texts published as early as 1802.¹⁰⁰ In his *Further
Presentations from the System of Philosophy* (1803), Schelling himself criticized those who

> see in the being of the absolute nothing but a pure night [and] a mere negation of
> multiplicity.

¹⁰¹ Snow is lead to conclude that, despite never amending the preface, Hegel was probably
sincere in his letter to Schelling in 1807.¹⁰² According to Jason Wirth, the two did meet
again by chance 22 years later at a bath house in Karlsbad. Hegel wrote to his wife after
the encounter that the two hit it off instantly “like cordial friends of old” as though
nothing had happened.¹⁰³ Schelling became increasingly critical of Hegel’s system after
his death in 1831—or at least critical of what Hegel asserted his purely “negative” system
was capable of deducing. Despite their differences (or perhaps because of them),
Schelling probably wouldn’t have hesitated to apply his historical statement about the
apparently opposed philosophies of Descartes and Bacon to Hegel and himself:

> In this history of the human spirit it is easy to see a certain simultaneity among
great minds, who from differing sides nevertheless are finally working towards
the same goal.

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¹⁰¹ Wirth, “Schelling’s Contemporary Resurgence,” 586.
¹⁰³ Wirth, “Schelling’s Contemporary Resurgence,” 587.
Whether Hegel’s polemical comment was directed at Schelling or not, its effect was that most histories of philosophy have come to place Hegel’s system at the pinnacle of the German Idealist project, with Schelling’s work seen as a mere stepping stone if it is mentioned at all. The difference between the philosophical approaches of Schelling and Hegel will be explored in a subsequent section.105

Rounding out the notable commentaries on Schelling’s philosophy are Bernard Freydberg’s Schelling’s Dialogical Freedom Essay: Provocative Philosophy Then and Now (2008) and Jason Wirth’s The Conspiracy of Life: Meditations on Schelling and His Time (2011). Freydberg proposes that Schelling’s thought is receiving more attention today “due precisely to its  untimeliness.” 106 Schelling had a unique ability to integrate aspects of ancient and modern thought, producing a strange hybrid philosophy that offers a fresh way forward for a generation of thinkers tired of the postmodern ban on metaphysics.107 Freydberg also draws out the significance of Schelling’s dialogical method, a method first announced in a footnote in the Freedom essay:

In the future, [I] will...maintain the course...taken in the present treatise where, even if the external shape of a dialogue is lacking, everything arises as a sort of dialogue.108

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105 See section heading “The difference between Hegel’s and Schelling’s system of philosophy” below.

106 Bernard Freydberg, Schelling’s Dialogical Freedom Essay: Provocative Philosophy Then and Now, 1.

107 See especially Graham Harman’s Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things: “The term ‘guerrilla metaphysics’ is meant to signify...my full awareness that the traditional cathedrals of metaphysics lie in ruins. Let the rubble sleep—or kick it a bit longer, if you must. But new towers or monuments are still possible, more solid and perhaps more startling that those that came before” (256).

Freydberg describes Schelling’s literary style in the *Freedom* essay, and in the later drafts of *The Ages of the World*, as participatory, more akin to “a map for a journey” than “a series of philosophical claims.”

Wirth similarly argues that, with Schelling, “the question of style is not frivolous.” Schelling’s presentation of philosophy as a work of freedom makes it “as much art as science.” Schelling’s scientific art of dialogue begins always *in media res*, according to Wirth, such that in order to engage in philosophical composition, Schelling must first give over total authority over the course of a work’s self-development to the darkness of the Other. Wirth offers Schelling’s dialogical style as an example of the “deep difference” between his own and Hegel’s more abstract dialectical approach.

In a chapter bringing Schelling into conversation with Sri Aurobindo, Wirth points to their treatment of the Indian spiritual traditions to further distinguish Schelling from Hegel. Unlike Hegel, who declared that India was “sunk in the most frightful and scandalous superstition,” Schelling cherished the *Bhagavad-Gitā* and even believed, according to Wirth, that “Greek philosophy should be considered a flower of South Asia.” In his introduction to *Schelling Now: Contemporary Readings* (2005), Wirth

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110 Wirth, *The Conspiracy of Life*, 158.


112 Wirth, *The Conspiracy of Life*, 159.

113 Wirth, *The Conspiracy of Life*, 216.

114 Wirth, *The Conspiracy of Life*, 223.


further suggests that Schelling’s “ecological sensitivity” and “receptivity to the call of the earth” represent philosophical possibilities “left largely unexplored by Hegel.”  

The difference between Hegel’s and Schelling’s system of philosophy

Early in his philosophical career while still a high school teacher in Nuremberg, Hegel suggested that, as a schoolmaster of philosophy, he is committed to the belief that philosophy like geometry is teachable, and must no less than geometry have a regular structure. Many commentators on the philosophical dispute between Hegel and Schelling cite this statement to illustrate the nature of their disagreement: while Hegel was bent on the formalization of the system into a deductive science, Schelling all but transformed science into art in order to prevent the blind necessity of the system from subsuming the creative freedom and personality of its author. If the very next sentences of Hegel’s statement are included, however, it becomes apparent that he was not as unaware of the important role of individual creativity as the previous sentence lets on:

Philosophy...no less than geometry must have a regular structure. But again, a knowledge of the facts in geometry and philosophy is one thing, and the mathematical or philosophical talent which procreates and discovers is another: my province is to discover that scientific form, or to aid in the formation of it.

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118 Hegel was headmaster from 1808-1816.
The differences between Schelling and Hegel are important and should not be overlooked, but nor should they be overplayed. Despite either’s public criticism of the other’s ideas, their positions are often difficult to clearly distinguish without lapsing into caricature.122 Their personal lives from beginning to end took shape in the dialogical alembic of an intense and tumultuous friendship.123 They were both close students, perhaps the closest, of one another’s published texts. Hegel appropriated the historical-dialectical method brilliantly displayed in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) largely from what he learned in Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (1800).124 Indeed, the Phenomenology, a literary work of art, can be read as an attempt to make good on Schelling’s absolutization of aesthetics (=the study of appearance, i.e., phenomenology) and his prophesy of the coming of a poet who would sing society the new mythology of reason. On the other hand, the Phenomenology’s disingenuous dismissal of intellectual intuition, the keystone of Schelling’s early philosophy, had a pernicious effect on the public perception of his system, an effect that has lasted to this day.125

As Hegel’s own philosophical project developed and took form over the next few decades, the identification of the method of philosophy (=the science of logic) with that of geometry became increasingly important to him, backgrounding his earlier Schellingian acknowledgement of the irreducible role of the creative discoverer in the eternally beginning life of the system. By 1831, Hegel’s creative genius, once capable

122 Christopher Lauer, The Suspension of Reason in Hegel and Schelling, 174.
123 Wirth, “Schelling’s Contemporary Resurgence,” 587.
124 Lauer, The Suspension of Reason in Hegel and Schelling, 78, 95.
125 Wirth, “Schelling’s Contemporary Resurgence,” 586.
of the revelatory poetry of the *Phenomenology*, had calcified into the formulaic certainty of the *Encyclopedia*.\(^{126}\)

“Knowledge in geometry,” says Schelling,

is of a totally different nature than that in philosophy...Everyone who has reflected on the field of mathematics knows that geometry is a science of a logical character, that between the presupposition itself and its consequences there lies nothing else in the middle save mere thought.\(^{127}\)

For Schelling, it is *freedom* that distinguishes the philosophical from the geometrical method. His discomfort with Hegel’s purely logical approach, however, was not a rejection of systematic coherence. On the contrary, Schelling praised Hegel for his attention to detail and steadfast adherence to the necessary movement of the dialectic as it worked its way to a genuinely completed system.\(^{128}\) Schelling eventually realized that such a purely rational philosophy, concerned as it was with the *essence* of things rather than their *existence*, was precisely only the *negative* part of the whole of philosophy. The other part, *positive* philosophy, does not begin already caught in the conceptual net of self-reflexive reason; it begins, instead, with the ecstatic experience of wonder, an experience that compels thought to acknowledge its dependence on what Schelling referred to as the *unprethinkable* (*das Unvordenkliche*):

that which just exists is precisely that which crushes everything that may derive from thought, before which thought becomes silent, and before which reason itself bows down.\(^{129}\)

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\(^{126}\) *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1831).


Schelling’s opposition to Hegel’s system is not the result of its negative method, which if properly restricted to the sphere of logical possibility remains entirely valid. Schelling rejects only Hegel’s claim to have comprehended the fact of nature (=the existence of the actual world) solely through the purely logical and plainly demonstrable labor of reflective thought. Hegel’s ambitious philosophical project stumbles into error, according to Schelling, as a result of his reliance on two fundamental “fictions” to be considered in turn below: (1) the animism of the Concept, and (2) the transition, or release (Entlassens), of logic into nature. To be clear, these fictions are in a different way crucial components of Schelling’s own philosophical project. While Schelling is explicit about the aesthetic and speculative status of the “likely stories” (eikota muthon) he tells in the course of philosophizing beyond the edges of conceptual reality, Hegel tends to, as it were, fake his fictions. In his Philosophy of Religion (1827), for example, Hegel mimes the conceptual skeleton of Böhme’s magnificent vision of the Trinity, pretending to have digested the fruits of mystical intoxication while all the while really remaining bound to “the purest prose and a sobriety totally devoid of intuition.”

Schelling’s fictions represent a sincere attempt to give voice to the silent mythos of nature, thereby raising her unconscious poetry to the power of awakened spirit. To the extent that Hegel claims to have grasped the Absolute once and for all through the purely logical exercise of clear and distinct ideas, his “fictions” lack deep feeling for the ancient darkness of nature and an aesthetic sensitivity to the irony of the mythopoeic

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131 Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, trans. Matthews, 176; Schelling goes on: “One forgives the individual who staggers when he is actually drunk with intuition, but not one who by nature is actually sober and only wishes to appear as if he too is staggering.”
discourse required to become acquainted with that darkness.\textsuperscript{132} It is as if Hegel, as the saying goes, enlisted the floodlight of reason to go in search of darkness, while Schelling patiently waited for his eyes to adjust to the night of nature’s abyssal past. As Schelling writes in \textit{The Ages of the World},

> Since the beginning, many have desired to penetrate this silent realm of the past prior to the world in order to get, in actual comprehension, behind the great process...[I]f anything whatsoever checks the...entrance into this prehistoric time, it is precisely that rash being that wants rather to dazzle right from the beginning with spiritual concepts and expressions rather than descend to the natural beginnings of that life.\textsuperscript{133}

\textbf{1st Fiction: The animism of the Concept}

In his \textit{Science of Logic} (1812), Hegel attempts to pick up where the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} (1807) left off with the revelation of “Absolute Knowing, or Spirit that knows itself as Spirit.”\textsuperscript{134} Having progressed through the entire historical series of Spirit’s self-negating forms of consciousness, Hegel no longer claimed the title of philosopher, or \textit{lover of} wisdom, since he had now gained possession of wisdom itself.\textsuperscript{135} As a result of his self-initiation into Absolute Spirit, Hegel claimed to have stripped himself bare of the biological, psychological, and linguistic conditions of normal human subjectivity. Only after overcoming these prejudices did he believe it was possible to enter the

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{132} See Grant, “Philosophy Become Genetic,” \textit{The New Schelling}, 139-142 for a discussion of the role of mythic discourse in Plato’s \textit{Timaeus} (a text studied closely by Schelling), wherein likely stories allow him to approach topics unreachable by dialectical logic, like the “difficult and dark idea of matter” and the “fabrication” of the World Soul.

\textsuperscript{133} Schelling, \textit{The Ages of the World}, trans. Wirth, 63.

\textsuperscript{134} Hegel, \textit{The Hegel Reader}, trans. Houlgate, 122.

\textsuperscript{135} Hegel, \textit{Hegel Selections}, ed. Jacob Loewenberg, trans, J.B. Baillie, 5.
\end{footnotes}
domain of the pure science of logic, a domain wherein the certainty of the knower and the truth of what is known immediately coincide in the unity of the Concept:\textsuperscript{136} 

...the method which I follow in this system of logic–or rather which this system in its own self follows...is the only true method. This is self-evident simply from the fact that it is not something distinct from its object and content; for it is the inwardness of the content, the dialectic which it possesses within itself, which is the mainspring of its advance.\textsuperscript{137}

Contrary to Hegel's claim to have articulated (or rather to have been the instrument for the articulation of) “the only true method,” for Schelling, there can be no final and universally valid philosophy, since if such a system were to exist, it would effectively nullify the significance of free and irreducibly unique individuals, and thereby also render the possibility of moral action and genuine history meaningless.\textsuperscript{138} Schelling never denies the need for systematicity, but for him, the Absolute is not only a system, but also a life.\textsuperscript{139} The Concept is not self-grounding or independent of its existential conditions: “the concept ‘exists’ only in the individual personalities of human beings.”\textsuperscript{140} Schelling was forced in the course of his philosophical development to admit “how infinitely far everything that is personal reaches,” so far that the inner dialectic of knowledge is nearly reduced to the silence of its own impossibility.\textsuperscript{141}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item Lauer, Suspension of Reason in Hegel and Schelling, 102.
\item Matthews, "Introduction,” The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 57.
\item Schelling, Schellings sämtliche Werke, 7/403.
\item Matthews, "Introduction,” The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 49.
\item Schelling, Ages of the World, trans. Manfred Schröter, 103.
\end{thebibliography}
Hegel’s claim to have no subjective influence upon the dialectical method “which this system in its own self follows” is the main object of Schelling’s first criticism. Schelling’s commitment to a philosophy of freedom (“for true philosophy can start only from free actions”\textsuperscript{142}) lead him to reject the notion of an impersonally animated Concept as a mere fiction. “The first presupposition of the philosophy that allegedly presupposes nothing,” says Schelling,

was thus that the pure logical concept has the property or nature, of itself (since the subjectivity of the philosopher should be totally excluded), to change into its opposite (to, so to speak, overthrow itself), in order to again change back into itself; a deed that one can think of a real, living being, but of a mere concept one can neither think nor imagine, but can really only assert.\textsuperscript{143}

In order to get the gears of his logical system turning without any presuppositions, Hegel must attempt to perform a magic trick, a “logical creatio ex nihilo.”\textsuperscript{144} Hegel begins his trick with what at first seems to be immediate being. This simple being, in its indeterminateness, turns out in fact to be empty and so is equivalent to nothing. Upon further reflection, what at first seemed to be immediate being-nothing is understood to have all along been “the result of reflection’s negation of its own self-relation.”\textsuperscript{145} In other words, the negation of immediate being by non-being, in its truth, is always already mediated, an expression of the self-reflexivity of the Concept. Immediate being’s negation into non-being is itself doubly negated, revealing that the self-negating activity

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\textsuperscript{142} Schelling, \textit{Schellings sämtliche Werke}, trans. Matthews, I/1, 243.
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\textsuperscript{143} Schelling, \textit{Schellings sämtliche Werke}, trans. Matthews, I/10, 212.
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\textsuperscript{144} Matthews, “Introduction,” \textit{The Grounding of Positive Philosophy}, 60.
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of the Concept had been at work behind the scenes all along. The logic is supposedly able to animate itself as a result of the unstable tension generated through the negation of a negation. Hegel’s trick is to prove that mediation is in the end the truth of immediacy.

Schelling is quite willing to commend Hegel for patiently following the logic of double negation to its objective conclusion, but he remains unconvinced of the status of its origin in so-called “immediate being.” From Schelling’s perspective, there is no way to comprehend such an immediate being but through an act of intuition. Such an intuition would grasp that which genuinely comes before reflection and serves as its ground. For the first moment of his logic to have any content, Hegel must presuppose outside the Concept what he thinks he has derived from within its process of self-negation.

Even if Hegel could trick his logic into its self-animating progression without the presupposition of intuited being, Schelling maintains that the completed system could only pronounce upon the essence or whatness of things, without for that reason having anything definite to say about the contingent existence of actual things. Hegel’s logic, according to Schelling,

was only about the content of what is real, but regarding this content, the fact that it exists is something purely contingent: the circumstance of whether it exists or not does not change my concept in the least.

Just as Kant showed concerning the ontological argument for the existence of God, Hegel’s logic of essences leaves actual existence underdetermined. Even if, as Leibniz

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argued, from God’s essence as the highest being existence necessarily follows, this formula can tell us only that if God exists, God’s existence would be necessary a priori. Whether God, or the purely logical content of any concept, actually exists cannot be known but through experience. The underdetermination of Hegel’s logic vis-à-vis existence leads us into his next fiction.

2nd Fiction: The release (Entlassen) of logic into nature

Hegel describes his Absolute system, which includes the spheres of logic, nature, and spirit, as “a circle of circles” wherein each sphere holographically contains the others as parts of the Whole within itself. Accordingly, the links between each of these spheres are said not to be the result of any real process of transition, since taken separately, the true content of any one sphere is nothing more than the result of its antecedent and an indication of its successor. Despite his ideal desire for the holographic circulation of the spheres of the Absolute system, Hegel must begin his actual exposition within the circumference of a singular sphere. The paradigmatic idealist, Hegel of course decides to begin with the science of logic, which he describes as

the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence, before the creation of nature and a finite mind.

Schelling’s die Weltalter project was also an attempt to peer into the nature of God before creation; but unlike Hegel, he is concerned to account not only for the structure

of God’s internal necessity, but for God’s willingness to risk his eternal essence in the creation of a physical universe endowed with genuine freedom. Strictly speaking, there can be no reason for such a risk, since this would immediately draw it back into the sphere of necessary logical determinations.\textsuperscript{154} Schelling’s claim is that God is not only a logic, but a life—not just a law-like system, but a loving personality.\textsuperscript{155} The difficulty of philosophically grounding such a claim is borne out by Schelling’s repeated failure to compose a definitive and complete version of \textit{The Ages of the World}; on the other hand, the very incompletion of this project could be read as a justification of its core insight into the inscrutability of God’s eternally beginning nature, a nature before which there would remain only the growing silent that the helplessness and faint audibility of language really seeks to approach.\textsuperscript{156}

For Hegel, the link between God and creation, or between logic and nature, should be “perfectly transparent”; all that needs to be said about it is that God “freely releases [himself] in [his] absolute self-assurance and inner poise.”\textsuperscript{157} For Schelling, this depiction amounts to a non-answer that shirks the difficulty of narrating the awesomeness and sheer facticity of nature’s coming-into-existence.\textsuperscript{158} The profundity of the link between divinity and nature cannot be so easily “released.” The link—Plato’s “secret band”\textsuperscript{159}—holding One and All in communion with the Whole is precisely that which can never be released but only ever re-bound. Schelling says of secular modern

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{154} Lauer, \textit{The Suspension of Reason in Hegel and Schelling}, 163.
  \item \textsuperscript{155} Schelling, \textit{The Ages of the World}, trans. Wirth, 5-6.
  \item \textsuperscript{156} Schelling, \textit{Schellings sämtliche Werke}, trans. Wirth, II/1, 312.
  \item \textsuperscript{157} Hegel, “Science of Logic,” Ch. 3, \textit{The Hegel Reader}, trans. Houlgate, 250; That the personal pronoun here is masculine is purely a convention; the essential point is that it be personal, rather than the impersonal “it.”
  \item \textsuperscript{158} Lauer, \textit{The Suspension of Reason in Hegel and Schelling}, 164.
  \item \textsuperscript{159} Matthews, \textit{Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy}, 23.
\end{itemize}
philosophy, including Hegel’s, that its “main weakness” is its lack of appreciation for the supreme importance of intermediate concepts between such extremes as spirit v. matter, morality v. mechanics, creator v. cosmos. Intermediate concepts such as life between mind and matter, or human between universe and divinity are “the only concepts that actually explain anything in all of science.”

Though Hegel claims that the free release of nature from the Mind of God is only a figurative expression, his science of logic depends upon this release being a conceptual category, since otherwise the real which was released would no longer be the rational. Schelling calls his bluff by asking what “the astounding category of the release (Entlassen)” actually explains. The question remains: is there, or is there not a truly extralogical realm of nature that is not always already swallowed back up by spirit into the Mind of God? If something has been released from God, what is it? Hegel offers too little in response to such questions.

Schelling’s positive philosophy

In the theosophy of Jakob Böhme, fantastic expressions concerning the emergence of creation from God are at least the result of genuine intuitions and “the predilection for nature as opposed to art,” while in the dry systems of the Hegelian type, “there is but unnatural and conceited art.” Hegel’s dialectical logic makes itself the beginning of everything, the source even of nature.

In *The Ages of the World*, Schelling attempts (whether successful or not) to pass through and beyond (*über etwas hinaus*) the dialectical science of logic into a way of knowing nature no longer forgetful of her status as the primordial beginning of all things.\(^{163}\) While Hegel claims his science of logic explains the essence of God and the existence of nature, Schelling’s argues that the nature of the link between Creator and creation cannot be explained according to a geometrical method of demonstration. To know nature as she comes-into-being, the philosopher must come to know his own self-generation through her. The proper form of expression for such generative philosophy is mythpoeia, or imaginative narration, since it transforms what would otherwise remain ideal reflection upon an abstract copy of the eternal beginning of nature into *autophusis philosophia*, or “nature itself philosophizing.”\(^{164}\)

As long as this age restricts itself to the interior and to the Ideal, it lacks the natural means of an external presentation. Now, after having long gone astray, it has again developed the recollection of nature and of nature’s former oneness with science. Yet it did not abide by this. Hardly had the first steps in reuniting philosophy with nature occurred when the old age of the physical had to be acknowledged and how it, very far from being the last, is, rather, the first from which everything begins, even the development of divine life. Since then, science no longer begins from the remoteness of abstract thoughts in order to descend from them to the natural. Rather, it is the reverse...Soon the contempt with which only the ignorant still look down on everything physical will cease and once again


\(^{164}\) Grant, *Philosophies of Nature After Schelling*, 188.
the following saying will be true: The stone that the builders rejected has become the cornerstone.165

Schelling’s pursuit of a physics of divinity is a result of his attendance to the non-rational dimensions of existence. Though he admitted that a negative philosophy like Hegel’s, bound to circle within the necessary and demonstrable proofs of logic, should remain the philosophy of the Academy, he also called for a positive philosophy to complement the negative by making it adequate to actual life. Positive philosophy is an emphatic knowing that overcomes doubt, not through the certainty of science, but through the free decision to love the world.166 Schelling’s emphatic way of knowing re-unifies the powers of feeling and thinking torn asunder by the dualism inherent to modern epistemology, revealing in the soul an instinctual moral connection to the physical ground of God.167

As the Eleusinian mysteries were divided between a minor and a major rite, so too must philosophy be divided into the negative and the positive, where the latter presupposes initiation into the former.168 It is precisely through the recognition of the limits of negative philosophy—of its inability to account for a living God or for the actual creation of the world—that the need for a positive philosophy is realized. Such a positive account would no longer be simply mythic, since unlike myth, it would not be oriented exclusively to the past, but would open up into an unprethinkable (Unvordenklichkeit)


167 Freydberg, Schelling’s Dialogical Freedom Essay, 82-83.

future intimated only by the activity of free individuals and the loving communities to which they belong.  

**Metaphysically (un)grounding the natural sciences**

Schelling's almost complete absence in Anglophone natural philosophy for more than 150 years (aside from his powerful effects on Coleridge, Peirce, and Emerson and through the intermediary of Naturphilosoph Alexander von Humboldt, his influence on Darwin) cannot be accounted for based solely on the popular reception of Hegel’s philosophical caricature of intellectual intuition as “the night in which all cows are black.” The more probable reason for his absence, as Bowie suggests, is that Schelling’s Naturphilosophie “was effectively killed off...as part of the overt praxis of the natural sciences” beginning in the 1840s as these sciences “[began] to fall under the spell of materialism and positivism.” Prior to the current resurgence in interest, historians of science tended to dismiss Naturphilosophie as a “strange and nearly impenetrable offshoot of the Romantic movement,” an offshoot that is “safely ignored.” So long as postkantian positivism (of the sort that refuses to make organism rather than

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170 According to Owen Barfield, “...as the law now stands, Schelling could have sued Coleridge in respect of one or two pages in the *Biographia Literaria.*” Barfield, *What Coleridge Thought*, 6.

171 When asked about his influences by William James, Peirce pointed to “all stages of Schelling, but especially his *Naturphilosophie.*” See 2n2 above.

172 Emerson referred to Schelling as a “hero.” See 14n58 above.


mechanism constitutive of nature) holds sway over the scientific imagination, Schelling’s thought will continue to languish on the fringes of philosophical activity. Fortunately, “the dangers of a scientistic approach to nature” are becoming increasingly well recognized, and alternative histories are being told that challenge the standard Enlightenment account of the dominance of mechanistic physics and biology. The fundamental incoherence of the postkantian positivist approach is such that, despite itself resting upon an implicitly postulated speculative dualism between mind and matter, it at the same time denies that there can be any scientific validity to philosophical speculation. “It is only then,” says Arran Gare,

    when the original practical engagement as an active force within the world is forgotten, that the illusions of dualism...appear.

Many natural scientists unpracticed in the methods of philosophy are quick to dismiss Schelling’s speculative physics for what they perceive to be a lack of respect for the empirical facts. Several scholars, including Gare, Robert Richards, Joseph Esposito, Frederick Beiser, and Iain Hamilton Grant have convincingly argued that Schelling painstakingly studied and significantly contributed to the natural sciences of his day. Richards characterizes Schelling’s natural philosophical works not as the wild frenzy of mystical analogizing that its positivist critics saw, but as “[groaning] with the

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176 Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, 30.
177 See especially Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life.
178 Gare, “From Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics,” 58.
179 Gare, “From Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics.”
180 Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life.
181 Esposito, Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature.
182 Beiser, German Idealism.
183 Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling.
weight of citations of the most recent, up-to-date experimental work in the sciences.”

Grant, while he acknowledges Schelling’s Naturphilosophie as a precursor of the new natural sciences of self-organization and complexity, warns us not to positivistically reduce [Schelling’s] philosophical interventions into nature to a theoretical resource to be raided as and when the natural sciences deem it necessary.

Keeping Grant’s desire to protect Naturphilosophie from such a positivistic reduction in mind, it is nonetheless interesting to note that Schelling shared the “aether hypothesis” with most of his scientific contemporaries. The aether remained the foundation of science’s understanding of electromagnetism until Einstein dismissed it as “an unnecessary burden on space” in 1905. The quantum revolution of the early 20th century, with its hypothesis of a non-local field or immaterial quantum vacuum underlying the extended universe, began to raise doubts about Einstein’s dismissal. After the recent tentative discovery of the related notion of a Higgs field, it would appear that “a new aether” is front and center again in physical science. Where this discovery will lead contemporary physicists remains to be seen, but for Schelling, the elastic properties of the aether were identified with the original duplicity of forces animating the common soul of nature, or World-Soul.

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184 Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 128.
185 Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, 11.
188 Paul Davies, The Cosmic Blueprint, 176.
189 Lederman, The God Particle, 375.
The two conflicting forces conceived at the same time in conflict and unity, lead to the idea of an organizing principle, forming the world into a system. Perhaps the ancients wished to intimate this with the world-soul.  

In the context of the aether hypothesis, it is important to remember that the main intent of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie was not merely the “application of abstract principles to an already existing empirical science”:

My object, rather, is first to allow natural science itself to arise philosophically, and my philosophy is itself nothing else than natural science. It is true that chemistry teaches us to read the letters, physics the syllables, mathematics Nature; but it ought not to be forgotten that it remains for philosophy to interpret what is read.

In other words, Schelling’s aim was never to produce hypothetical models of how the hidden mechanisms of phenomenal nature may or may not work. His philosophy of nature is an attempt to re-imagine the metaphysical foundations of natural science, such that the theorizing subject, as part of nature, is understood to be an active factor in the organic construction of the objective facts. For Schelling, the aether was less a scientific hypothesis than it was an organizational principle justifying scientific activity in the first place, since, following the ancient epistemic principle that “like is known by like” (Plato’s “syggeneity”), it granted the human soul participatory knowledge of the invisible substructure of the universe. Or, as Schelling put it, “What in us knows is the same as what is known.”

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When Schelling says that “to philosophize about nature means to create nature,”\textsuperscript{195} it should not be collapsed into the \textit{prima facie} quite similar statement by Kant, that “He who would know the world must first manufacture it—in his own self, indeed.”\textsuperscript{196} Kant’s approach to the study of nature is grounded in subjective voluntarism, wherein the philosopher fabricates “nature” as his own object according to the transcendentally deduced categories delimiting his experience.\textsuperscript{197} Schelling’s \textit{Naturphilosophie}, on the contrary, re-interprets the epistemic position of the natural scientist: where the postkantian scientist can only grasp himself as thinking about nature from beyond nature, Schelling’s scientific method involves awakening to oneself as “\textit{nature itself philosophizing (autophusis philosophia)}”\textsuperscript{198} As Grant describes it, “What thinks in me is what is outside me.”\textsuperscript{199} If the \textit{Naturphilosoph} is able to think as nature, she becomes “a new species equipped with new organs of thought.”\textsuperscript{200} Schelling’s \textit{Naturphilosophie} is an attempt to know nature unconditionally, i.e., not as the sum total of its created products, but as the creative activity giving rise to them.\textsuperscript{201} The question is no longer, as it was for Kant, “how do I make finite nature appear?”, but “what is the essence of nature’s infinite activity?”

Schelling’s philosophy of unthinged (\textit{Unbedingten}) nature is the necessary counter postulate to Fichte’s absolutely free ego, the next logical turn on the dialectical wheel


\textsuperscript{197} Grant, \textit{Philosophies of Nature After Schelling}, 2.


\textsuperscript{199} Grant, \textit{Philosophies of Nature After Schelling}, 158.

\textsuperscript{200} Schelling, \textit{Einleitung in die Philosophie (1830)}, trans. Grant, 57.

\textsuperscript{201} Schelling, \textit{First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature}, trans. Peterson, 14.
that makes known the presence of an unthought background, a dark abyss (Ungrund) before which the conscious ego can at first only mumble as it meets its long forgotten maker. Schelling’s discovery is that absolute spirit and absolute nature dependently co-arise as the polarized personalities of a natural divinity. The finite human ego is not a priori; rather Absolute nature is prioritized,202 since

Everything that surrounds us refers back to an incredibly deep past. The Earth itself and its mass of images must be ascribed an indeterminably greater age than the species of plants and animals, and these in turn greater than the race of men.203

“Philosophy,” according to Schelling, “is nothing other than a natural history of our mind.”204 The philosopher of nature “treats nature as the transcendental philosopher treats the self”205 by coming to see how

the activity whereby the objective world is produced is originally identical with that which is expressed in volition.206

Schelling’s is akin to an enactive, rather than representational account of scientific cognition. According to Evan Thompson, from an enactive perspective,

a natural cognitive agent—an organism, animal, or person—does not...operate on the basis of internal representations in the subjectivist/objectivist sense. Instead of internally representing an external world in some Cartesian sense, [it] enact[s] an environment inseparable from [its] own structure and actions.207

207 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, 59.
Schelling’s enactive account of natural science thereby recursively grounds the production of scientific knowledge in the living bodies, funded laboratories, invented technologies, and specialized communities through which it emerges. What science knows is not a passively reflected copy of objective nature as it appears before an aloof subject; rather, the scientist’s experiential facts co-emerge with his experimental acts:

Every experiment is a question put to Nature, to which it is compelled to give a reply. But every question contains an implicit a priori judgment; every experiment that is an experiment is a prophecy.\(^{208}\)

That every experimental design contains implicit a priori synthetic judgments (e.g., “every event has a cause,” “nature is an organized system”) is not to say that Schelling believed the natural scientist should try to deduce the structure of nature from a priori principles alone. He maintained that we know nothing except through and by means of experience,\(^{209}\) and therefore that synthetic a priori knowledge, though dialectically constructed, is subject to experimental falsification, theoretical revision, and replacement.\(^{210}\) Whereas for Kant, there exists an unreconcilable opposition between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, for Schelling, acts of cognition and facts of experience recursively condition one another in the endlessly spiraling pursuit of the unconditioned.\(^{211}\)

Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is more relevant to contemporary natural science’s vision of a creative cosmos than ever before. The classical mechanistic, entropic paradigm is being replaced by the new sciences of self-organization, which depict the universe as a


\(^{210}\) Gare, “From Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics,” 45.

progressive unfolding of kaleidoscopic activity; given this new context, Schelling’s dynamic evolutionary philosophy of nature can go a long way toward philosophically generating the underlying organizing principles “needed to supplement the laws of physics.”  

Contemporary natural science demands a firmer foundation for its theoretical and empirical discoveries than that given it by 17th century Cartesian metaphysics. Paradoxically, Schelling’s contribution to a more adequate metaphysical foundation for science involves destroying the long held belief that reality has any necessary foundation at all. Schelling’s is a process metaphysics that grounds the visible universe in infinite freedom and creativity.

Unlike the mechanistic paradigm, which assumes the necessary existence of inert corporeal matter and so cannot explain how creative activity and the emergence of organized form are possible, for Schelling, such creative organization is the driving force of nature, inert matter being one of its later products. The source and common medium of nature’s creative activity according to Schelling is universal “sensibility,” making his Naturphilosophie a variety of panexperientialism. The ability to feel is what makes all apparently mechanical motion possible, since without such a universal experiential aether, no force could be felt and so exchanged between or across material bodies.

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212 Davies, *The Cosmic Blueprint*, 2-5, 203.

213 Gare, “From Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics,” 28.

214 Usually, the emergence of life and consciousness are explained by mechanists as random chance occurrences—the opposite of a theoretical explanation, since they are said to emerge for no reason.

215 “Panexperientialism” is a term coined by Whiteheadian philosopher David Ray Griffin to refer to any philosophy of nature that affirms that every actual occasion in the universe enjoys some level of experience; see Griffin, *Parapsychology, Philosophy, and Spirituality: A Postmodern Exploration*, 99.

By making sensibility the ultimate condition of nature’s dynamic organization, Schelling reverses the Kantian and Newtonian prioritization of external relations (i.e., linear mechanism, where causes are always external to effects) and instead understands nature as a holistic system of internal relations (i.e., reciprocal organism, where cause and effect are circular).\textsuperscript{217} The former externalist approach is unable to account for the origin of motion and activity in nature, since it deals only with secondary mechanical effects.\textsuperscript{218} Schelling’s dynamical approach does not assume the existence of corporeal bodies that exchange mechanical forces, but describes the construction of these bodies as a side-effect the originally infinite activity of nature’s fundamental forces of organization.\textsuperscript{219} Viewed from the height of nature’s fundamental organization, according to Schelling,

\begin{quote}
the particular successions of causes and effects (that delude us with the appearance of mechanism) disappear as infinitely small straight lines in the universal curvature of the organism in which the world itself persists.\textsuperscript{220}
\end{quote}

What needs explaining from the perspective of Schelling’s self-organizing aether is not creative activity, but the appearance of inhibition, habit, and permanence.\textsuperscript{221} Schelling accounts for inhibitions in the cosmic flow by positing an “original duplicity in nature” as two infinitely active forces striving in opposition to one another.\textsuperscript{222} Nature is, in itself, infinite, and so only it can inhibit itself. Were there no such polarized self-inhibition in

\textsuperscript{217} Gare, “From Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics,” 52.


\textsuperscript{221} Schelling, \textit{First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature}, trans. Peterson, 17.

\textsuperscript{222} Schelling, \textit{First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature}, trans. Peterson, 11.
nature, space would have immediately expanded into emptiness and all time would have passed in the flash of an instantaneous point.\textsuperscript{223} The natural products of gradual cosmic evolution—whether atoms, molecules, stars, galaxies, cells, animals, or humans—are the visible expressions of a determinate proportion of these polarized forces, each one a temporary configuration of nature’s infinite process of formation.\textsuperscript{224} That is, each product is really a recapitulation of one and the same archetypal organism, only inhibited at a different stage of development and made to appear as a finite approximation of the infinite original.\textsuperscript{225} Nature’s rich variety of organic products only \textit{appear} to be finite entities, when in reality, they contain within themselves, as though in a mirror image, the infinite whole of living nature’s creative activity:

...a stream flows in a straight line forward as long as it encounters no resistance. Where there is resistance—a whirlpool forms. Every original product of nature is such a whirlpool, every organism. The whirlpool is not something immobilized, it is rather something constantly transforming—but reproduced anew at each moment. Thus no product in nature is fixed, but it is reproduced at each instant through the force of nature entire.\textsuperscript{226}

Schelling’s attempt to ground the emergence of the physical universe in an unstable abyss (\textit{Abgrund}) of dynamic forces and to re-conceive nature in terms of becoming rather than being makes it a philosophical precursor to Ilya Prigogine’s work on the

physics of non-equilibrium processes. Prigogine’s Nobel Prize winning discoveries lead him to announce the birth of a new science, a science that views us and our creativity as part of a fundamental trend present at all levels of nature. Like Prigogine, who called for “the end of certainty” and of the Cartesian/Newtonian mechanistic paradigm, Schelling sought to give an account of the physical universe that does not irrevocably separate the human observer from the nature observed. Scientific objectivity, as a merely reflective method, can prove useful; but there is no coherent metaphysical justification for treating the subject-object split as a reality. “I absolutely do not acknowledge two different worlds,” says Schelling, but rather insist on only one and the same, in which everything, even what common consciousness opposes as nature and mind, is comprehended.

The natural scientific consequence of insisting on a polar unity between subject and object is that nature can no longer be conceived of as a heap of objects or a giant machine, but becomes rather a universal organism in whose life all finite creatures participate. Cartesian science, which searched for objective matters of fact independent of the values of life and society, comes to be replaced by cosmopolitical science, which foregrounds what the Whiteheadian philosopher Bruno Latour has called “matters of concern.” Such a replacement re-knits the frayed edges of cosmos and

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227 See Davies, *The Cosmic Blueprint*, 175; Late in his life, Prigogine collaborated with the Whiteheadian philosopher Isabel Stengers regarding the philosophical implications of his work.


anthropos back together, allowing for the composition of a new planetary constitution more inclusive of the diverse community of species that call earth home. In the next section, the anthropological and political consequences of re-situating the human being within such a universe are unpacked.

The Nature of Human Freedom

The Naturphilosoph comes to understand “Nature as subject.” This does not imply that nature necessarily conforms to the transcendental structure of the human mind (a form of anthropomorphism), but rather that human consciousness is itself a recapitulation of the uncanny subjectivity of nature. Where Kant says we can’t know nature in itself, and Fichte says nature is my own projection, Schelling turns us back upon the strangeness of our own humanity to ask "do we really know who and what we are, or where we came from?"

Most people turn away from what is concealed within themselves just as they turn away from the depths of the great life and shy away from the glance into the abysses of that past which are still in one just as much as the present.

In his celebrated 1809 treatise, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, Schelling begins by exploring traditional theological, cosmological, and anthropological answers to the question of human nature. He re-emerges, not with more answers, but with surprising new questions. Schelling discovers that the freedom of human reason, rather than being above or outside nature, bottoms out into the sublime tension inherent to cosmogenesis. Freedom is found to be grounded in the

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eternal struggle between gravity and light, the polarity originally constitutive of nature herself.

The human freedom to decide for good or evil, despite being grounded in nature’s primordial cision of forces, nonetheless irrevocably sets us apart from the animal kingdom. Human beings are conscious of their participation in original sin, making it impossible to explain sin merely as a regression to brute instincts, since this would imply a lack of consciousness and freedom. For Schelling, evil is unmistakably spiritual in origin, meaning it is a possibility only for absolutely free beings. Schelling draws approvingly upon the work of his theosophical calibrator Fr. Baader:

it would be desirable that the corruption in man were only to go so far as his becoming animal; unfortunately, however, man can stand only below or above animals.\(^2\)

The spiritual freedom of the human being should not be confused with a "capacity" for freedom, e.g., the ability of a consumer to choose Corn Flakes or Cheerios for breakfast, as this characterization entirely conceals the literally decisive importance of the originating act of freedom. Freedom is not a capacity or ability, since this would imply the pre-existence of some more foundational subject who could employ freedom as a means to its own ends. Freedom is the very ground of subjectivity, the abyss from which subjectivity first emerges. As a human spirit, I just am the freedom to decide for good or evil, and nothing besides. This de-cision is the essence of my freedom—which in fact is not mine at all, since it is more correct to say that I belong to freedom.\(^3\) There is no me behind or before the spiritual crisis of this originally free deed. My personality


\(^3\) Martin Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809), trans. Joan Stambaugh, 9.
just is the decision between good and evil, a decision made eternally time and time again. Original sin—the natural human propensity to do evil—is a necessary side-effect of our independent free will. The divine freedom in which we partake forces us to live in conflict, caught between the desire to secure our own particularity and the general will of God toward universal love. For this reason, according to Schelling,

> the will reacts necessarily against freedom as that which is above the creaturely and awakes in freedom the appetite for what is creaturely just as he who is seized by dizziness on a high and steep summit seems to be beckoned to plunge downward by a hidden voice.\(^{236}\)

Such dizzying spiritual freedom, though unique, is not best understood as a special human difference, some distinct capacity present only in our species. As Jason Wirth puts it:

> the kind or species that marks the human marks the place where the discrete nature of natural kinds itself returns to its originary crisis. The human kind is the kind that can complicate the discourse of natural kinds.\(^{237}\)

Our uniqueness as humans is that we recapitulate the very essence of nature herself; further, because she remains our ground, the reflection of our consciousness upon this ground generates self-consciousness: *humanity is nature become conscious of herself as subject*. While other organisms remain submerged in the unity of natural becoming, the human, like the divine, is eternally beginning, always deciding anew to erotically reproduce itself in an attempt to overcome the irreducible otherness within itself (i.e., evil). Unlike the divine, however, there is no necessary assurance that love will overcome evil, that the otherness will be dynamically re-engaged in the sacred marriage of eternal

\(^{236}\) Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*, trans. Love and Schmidt, 47,

\(^{237}\) Wirth, *The Conspiracy of Life*, 197.
circulation. Hence the fall into history, the rise of the state, and the suffering and confusion of earthly human life wherein evil is constantly externalized and projected.

Schelling saw no hope in nationalistic politics or state bureaucracies. Our present state-supported techno-capitalist empire is justified only by the pretense that the total rationalization of human life can eliminate evil.\textsuperscript{238} Schelling characterizes secular modernity by its tendency to “[push] its philanthropism all the way to the denial of evil,”\textsuperscript{239} thereby reducing the complex theological significance of sin to the more easily manageable problems of techno-science.\textsuperscript{240} After all, evil doers can be quickly destroyed by laser guided missiles launched from remote-controlled drones, depression and anxiety can be cured with mood-enhancing psychiatric medication, and climate change can be reversed through a bit of simple geo-engineering.

Joseph Lawrence follows Schelling in calling for a renewed inquiry into the nature of good and evil, an inquiry now even more \textit{untimely} than it was in Schelling’s day—\textit{untimely} because such theologically-laden concerns run counter to the self-understanding of the secular Enlightenment, whose founding myth involves the throwing off of traditional religion in favor of the supposedly self-grounding power of instrumental rationality. Lawrence asks how we are to understand modernity’s self-contradictory elevation of rationality to a secular religion at the same time that it prohibits genuine metaphysical or theological investigation:

\begin{quote}
If reality were recognized as truly rational, we would encourage the attempt to understand its inner meaning...we would also place our trust in it, instead of
\end{quote}


relying as heavily as we do on politics and technology to hold the world at bay. Metaphysical irrationalism is thus the deep premise of modern rationality. It alone provides the explanation for why practical and instrumental reason have achieved such dominance over theoretical reason.241

It is modernity’s repressed fear of chaos and meaninglessness, in other words, that leads it to turn away from “the big questions” in favor of the simple solutions and small pleasures of techno-scientific consumerism. Inquiring into the essence of human freedom is especially terrifying for the narcissistic ego used to the pampering of consumer capitalism. The willing soul must learn, according to Schelling,

to stand alone before the infinite: a gigantic step, which Plato likened to death. What Dante saw inscribed on the door to hell must (in a different sense) adorn the entrance to philosophy: “Abandon all hope, ye who enter here.” Whoever wants truly to philosophize must be stripped of all hope, all desire, all longing. He must want nothing, know nothing, feel his naked impoverishment, and be capable of surrendering everything for the sake of winning its return...one will have to be taken quite simply into the beginning, to be born anew.242

Even the divine has to pass through the purifying fire of the abyss and overcome the fear of existence in order to realize its creative freedom.243 Unlike human beings, who have the ethical community to console them, for God, the primal being, there was no one else to come to its aid: “in its stultifying solitude...[God] must fight its way through chaos for itself, utterly alone.”244 Human beings can take refuge in the social mores of the day, which, in the consumer capitalist context, offer an untold number of options for

temporary escape and diversion from the soul’s inevitable encounter with the purifying fires of eternity. When radical evil does break through the thin veneer of bourgeois social order, it is always neatly localized in a deranged criminal who can be impersonally (and so guiltlessly) executed by the state.\textsuperscript{245}

Unlike Hegel, who deified the state as an end in itself, Schelling understood it as a means made necessary by the fall, nature’s way of maintaining some semblance of social order given the sinfulness of individuals.\textsuperscript{246} Schelling realized the paradoxical results of any attempt to justify the existence of the state, since if a just state were able to establish the conditions necessary for the genuine moral freedom of its citizens, this would imply that it no longer reserved the right to exercise coercive force to uphold its laws, and to that extent, that it no longer served a social function and so could be dissolved.\textsuperscript{247} Though he was dismissed as a reactionary apologist for the conservative Christianity of the Prussian state by Engels during the Berlin lectures late in his life,\textsuperscript{248} Lawrence argues for a revolutionary Schelling who consistently sought liberation for humanity through ethical renewal and authentic religiosity, rather than state politics.\textsuperscript{249} The true but greatly misunderstood task of the modern age, according to Schelling, “is to shrink the state itself...in every form.”\textsuperscript{250} Even if the state cannot be abolished outright, a redeemed humanity would at least

\textsuperscript{245} Lawrence, “Schelling’s Metaphysics of Evil,” \textit{The New Schelling}, 172.

\textsuperscript{246} Lawrence, “Philosophical Religion and the Quest for Authenticity,” \textit{Schelling Now}, 25.

\textsuperscript{247} Schelling, \textit{Schellings Sämtliche Werke}, 7:461-462; Devin Lane Shaw, \textit{Freedom and Nature in Schelling’s Philosophy of Art}, 140-141.


\textsuperscript{249} Lawrence, “Philosophical Religion and the Quest for Authenticity,” \textit{Schelling Now}, 26.

ensure that the state...progressively [divested] itself of the blind force that
governs it, [transfiguring] this force into intelligence.  

Far from an apologist for state power, while still in Munich Schelling had openly defied
the Bavarian government by lecturing on theological issues, and when he was called to
Berlin by the Prussian king in 1841, he agreed only on the condition that he be granted
complete academic freedom. 

True human salvation cannot lie in the false gods of the market and the state, which in
their attempt to repress and deny the chaotic abyss at the root of nature only further
empower it. Evil appears real precisely when a human being or society denies the evil in
itself to wage war against it in others. It is precisely in order to avoid feeding this
“dialectic of revenge” that Jesus tells his disciples, “resist not evil, but whosoever shall
smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.” Love can only exist along
side the possibility of evil, since both are grounded in freedom. To eliminate the
possibility of evil would be to eliminate freedom and therefore love.

By metaphysically rooting evil in the darkness of divine nature, Schelling transforms
the traditional moral obsession with theodicy into the aesthetics of theogonic tragedy.
Instead of interpreting suffering as the punishment of a vengeful God, as in traditional
theodicies, Schelling repeatedly emphasizes the extent to which suffering is inherent to
the creative process itself, even for God. It was God who, in an eternally past act of

\[\text{252 Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, trans. Matthews, 10.}\]
\[\text{253 Lawrence, “Schelling’s Metaphysics of Evil,” The New Schelling, 172.}\]
\[\text{254 Matthew 5:39.}\]
\[\text{255 Lawrence, “Schelling’s Metaphysics of Evil,” The New Schelling, 174.}\]
absolute love, provided “the prototype of all suffering innocents.” Schelling calls us to live up to the nature of our complicated human kind by reconciling our sense of fallenness with our divine likeness, thereby finding the endurance necessary to pass through the spirit-forging fire of God’s eternal beginning to be born again, now not only of water but also of spirit.

Devin Zane Shaw critiques what he calls Schelling’s “mythologization of politics” from a Marxist perspective, arguing that he mystifies the material conditions of social relations by emphasizing spiritual cultivation (Bildung) over democratic political engagement. Shaw seems to misunderstand Schelling’s call for the mythopoeic revitalization of the public sphere by conflating it with totalitarianism:

the a priori conception of universality as organic totality ignores or disregards the fact that the political space itself is the domain of the struggle over what the definition of universality (and political inclusion) is.

While it is not misleading to refer to Schelling’s conception of the ideal relationship between individuals and their community as “organic,” this relationship need not be “totalizing” in the sense that Shaw suggests. From his time as a young professor in Jena through to his role as Secretary General of the Academy of Fine Arts in Munich (a position he held from 1808 to 1821), Schelling sought the transformation of society by way of philosophical education. The highest form of social organization could not be imposed externally by state magistrates pretending to some a priori knowledge of true

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257 John 3:5.
259 Shaw, Freedom and Nature in Schelling’s Philosophy of Art, 117.
260 Schelling, On University Studies, 22.
universality; rather, Schelling saw this form emerging freely from the citizenry itself as a result of their artistic, scientific, and religious cultivation.

This rigor of enculturation, like the rigor of the life in nature, is the kernel out of which the first true grace and divinity poor forth like blood.  

Contrary to Shaw’s claim that Schelling disregards the importance of the democratic struggle for political inclusion, Schelling recognized that genuine democracy is only possible given a citizenry aware of the cosmological, anthropological, and theological complexities of authentic freedom. Without a philosophical culture capable of sustaining inquiry into the cosmic and spiritual depths of human nature, the equality rightly demanded by democratic societies can only devolve into the leveling homogenization of consumer capitalism, where freedom is reduced to the ability to identify with the corporate brand of one’s choice. The trivialization and inversion of freedom inherent to “democratic” capitalism makes human beings forgetful of their divine-cosmic ground, functioning not only to alienate individuals from their communities, but humanity from earth.

261 Schelling, Schellings Sämtliche Werke, trans. Wirth, I/7, 393.

262 Such freedom is “inverted” because it elevates the periphery (our animal egotism) over the Center (our spiritual potential for love); Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Love and Schmidt, 34-36.
Bibliography

Works by F.W.J. Schelling


**Other works**


